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Abstract Scientific and statistical inferences build heavily on explicit, parametric
models, and often with good reasons. However, the limited scope of parametric mod-
els and the increasing complexity of the studied systems in modern science raise the
risk of model misspecification. Therefore, I examine alternative, data-based inference
techniques, such as bootstrap resampling. I argue that their neglect in the philosoph-
ical literature is unjustified: they suit some contexts of inquiry much better and use a
more direct approach to scientific inference. Moreover, they make more parsimonious
assumptions and often replace theoretical understanding and knowledge about mech-
anisms by careful experimental design. Thus, it is worthwhile to study in detail how
nonparametric models serve as inferential engines in science.
Keywords Models · Data · Inductive inference · Nonparametric statistics ·
Bootstrap resampling
1 Probabilistic modeling
Modeling plays a key role in empirical science, especially when overarching theo-
ries cannot be applied. Many efforts in science focus on constructing, comparing and
revising models of physical entities, phenomena and processes. Bohr’s model of the
atom, Volterra’s model of predator-prey populations and the random walk model for
the motion of molecules in a fluid are among the most popular ones. Models enable
us to recognize fundamental relations between physical quantities, to understand the
effects of causal interventions and to generalize observed effects to more complex
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and realistic cases. Often, their construction is triggered by concrete puzzles: For in-
stance, Volterra (1926) developed his mathematical model of predator-prey population
dynamics in response to the surprising shortage of adriatic fish after World War I. Vol-
terra’s model started from abstract considerations, but its predictions were found to be
in stunning agreement with reality (see Weisberg’s (2007) case study for more details).
The way the Volterra model has been developed, refined and transferred to other scien-
tific inquiries exemplifies a general strategy: to set up mathematically tractable models
which capture fundamental mechanisms of the underlying system, and to gradually
amend and refine them in order to account for the complexity of large-scale systems in
the real world. In other words, models allow us to discover characteristic regularities
(e.g. cycles in the population dynamics) as well as to explain concrete phenomena,
such as “why does a disruption in fishing activity increase the predator/prey ratio?”
Hence, it is not surprising that philosophers of science have been spending a lot of
paper on the various features of model-building. In particular, they studied the function
of models as explanatory engines and the differences to straightforward descriptions
and empirical generalizations. Here, it has been pointed out that modelers make indi-
rect inferences about the target system: they study a (mathematical) model and hope
that the results, when transferred to the target system, remain approximately valid
(cf. Weisberg 2007, 2009). Moreover, constructing definite models presupposes knowl-
edge about mechanisms and causal interactions within a system, but on the other hand,
the technique of indirect inference also improves our structural understanding, and
leads to more reliable predictions (cf. Godfrey–Smith 2006). Volterra’s predator-prey
model exemplifies both of these features, as shown above.
This mechanistic ideal of modeling ceases to apply whenever data obey apparently
random patterns or when observations are disturbed by noise. In such cases we replace
deterministic relationships by probabilistic models that are tailor-made to reasoning
under uncertainty. The remainder of my paper focuses on probabilistic models that
have invaded almost all natural and social sciences, but I see no obstacles to generalize
my conclusions to deterministic models.
Definition 1 A parametric statistical model1 is an ordered triple (X ,A, (Pϑ)ϑ∈)
where (X ,A) is a measurable space (usually called the sample space) and (Pϑ)ϑ∈
is a family of probability measures on (X ,A).2
In this definition, the sample space X corresponds to the set of possible observations
whereas the σ -field A has only technical meaning, defining the set of ‘measurable’ sub-
sets of the sample space. Crucially, (Pϑ)ϑ∈ gives a family of probability distributions
on (X ,A), which describe one and the same sampling mechanism (i.e. the mechanism
that generates the data). The parameter ϑ that calibrates the sampling mechanism is,
however, unknown. By restricting the set of sampling distributions to a parametric
family, the uncertainty about the structure of the underlying sampling mechanism is
removed. Instead, all uncertainty attaches now to the value of the unknown parameter
ϑ which we can try to infer from the observations we make: “this restriction and [. . .]
1 Often, the terms ‘parametric (statistical) model’ and ‘statistical model’ are used interchangeably.
2 Cf. Cox (2006).
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parametrization should aid one in understanding and efficiently estimating the [true]
distribution.”3
But how do those mathematical constructions that we call statistical models connect
to real systems? To what extent do they serve inferential tasks and indirect inference?
Well, in the same way that deterministic models do. Morgan and Morrison state that
formalizing a sampling process by means of a statistical model
“[. . .] provides a model for a certain type of situations thought to exist in the real
world and for which statisticians have well worked-out theories.”4
In other words, statistical models are the crucial link between stochastic theory and
the real world. One of the best-known illustration for Morgan and Morrison’s claim
is the coin flip model. A coin is either fair or biased towards one of the two sides,
and we represent the probability that it comes up ‘heads’ by a parameter ϑ . When
the coin is tossed repeatedly (a sequential Bernoulli trial), this is supposed to tell us
something about the model parameter ϑ . And if we represent the number of heads by,
let’s say, the Binomial distribution, this codes our causal knowledge that there are just
two possible outcomes in each trial, that the trials are independent from each other,
etc. As we will soon see, extensions of that very simple model can represent a wide
number of complex processes in science.
An extension of the coin flip model is the random walk—a discrete stochastic
process that describes ‘random’ wandering on a rectangular grid. In genetics, those
random walks are used to describe the variation of allele frequencies on a gene in a
given population, e.g. for simulating genetic drift. But actually, random walks also
serve as simplified models of the Brownian motion in hydrodynamics that describes a
molecule’s motion in a fluid. The Brownian motion is one of the most important dif-
fusion processes in physics and has numerous (mathematically) beautiful attributes:
It is a martingale with quadratic variation, has Normally distributed increments, the
Markov property, etc. The abundance of mathematical tools and analytical results that
can be used in working with the Brownian motion underlines the power of this model
and explains why it is often applied outside hydrodynamics, too, e.g. for modeling
financial markets.
Now, it is crucial to note that the scale limit of the random walk (if steps are
made infinitely small) is just the Brownian motion. So parametric models do not only
facilitate our analysis of real systems: there are also beautiful connections between
different parametric models (e.g. extended coin flip models and Brownian motions)
that enhance our understanding of physical phenomena and helps us to see how they
are related. So it does not come as a surprise that statistics textbooks in empirical
sciences as well as philosophers of science stress “the explicit need of a [parametric]
model in analyzing the significance of empirical data”.5
In particular, sophisticated testing procedures such as the F- and t-test have been
designed for specific parametric models (here: the Normal distribution) and are widely
3 Spirtes et al. (1993, p. 4).
4 Morgan and Morrison (1999, p. 33).
5 Suppes (1969 [1962], p. 33). Cf. Mayo (1996) and Cox (2006).
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used for testing scientifically relevant hypotheses. Intuitive and conceptually sound
measures of evidence, such as the likelihood ratio and Bayes factors, are motivated by
parametric assumptions (cf. Hacking 1965; Royall 1997). Hence, parametric models
play a distinguished role in inductive inference.
In spite of all these virtues, I believe that the significance and indispensability
of explicit parametric models in science has been overestimated. True, parametric
modeling facilitates structural understanding as well as closed form computations and
quantifying statistical evidence, but I argue that in scientific practice, valid conclusions
can often be attained by means of nonparametric, data-based inference. Those meth-
ods do not require understanding of some fundamental mechanisms in the system and
are therefore immune to pitfalls of parametric modeling. Bootstrap resampling gives a
convincing case study. Finally, I discuss to what extent nonparametric techniques can
serve as inferential engines, contrast them to traditional, parametric approaches in sta-
tistical modeling and argue that the former deserve more attention in the philosophical
debate.
2 Problems of parametric modeling
There is a central problem for a parametric modeler: to specify the right family of
models for the studied system. A parametric inference that is based on an inadequate
family of distributions will easily go astray. This is the problem of model misspe-
cification. To specify the right model, Ian Hacking (1965) gives three guidelines:
analogy to other, relevantly similar questions of inquiry, scientific theory, i.e. the
implications of our physical, biological, etc. background knowledge—in particular
knowledge about causal mechanisms—and finally, simplicity: the mathematical anal-
ysis must be feasible.6 When model specification fails, the entire inference is usually
worthless, and this is the reason why so much literature has addressed model misspe-
cification, even within the philosophical community. For instance, Mayo and Spanos
(2004) extensively discuss techniques for detecting misspecification.7
In general, correct model specification requires a lot of insights into the target sys-
tem. The more complex the processes we deal with and the scarcer our theoretical
understanding, the less we can be certain to have chosen the right model. When we
analyze complex systems, model specification is often not sufficiently guided by the-
oretical understanding. Causal relations between model variables may be unclear, the
entire system may be too complex to model, no mathematically tractable distribution
fits the specific values which the observations take, etc. Time series in econometrics
and meteorology provide salient examples. We have to account for the uncertainty
about the nature of the true distribution, and we cannot expect—as parametric models
often do—nature to behave according to our wishes for mathematical convenience
and structural simplicity. An example illustrates the point.
Example 1 (Efron and Tibshirani 1993): A group of seven mice is assigned medical
treatment after a test surgery. We would like to study whether this treatment is able to
6 Cf. Hacking (1965, pp. 83–85).
7 Cf. Burnham and Anderson (1998) for a practitioner’s perspectives.
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Table 1 Survival times (in days) in the treatment and the control group after the test surgery.
Survival times 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Median
Treatment group 94 197 16 141 38 99 23 – – 94
Control group 46 30 52 146 40 10 104 27 52 51
prolong the survival time of the mice, compared to mice which are operated without
being assigned the treatment. To this end, we set up a control group of nine mice. The
incoming data are displayed in Table 1.
Although the example is very simple, it is not clear how model specification could
proceed. Certainly, simplicity might speak for choosing a Normal distribution, but
how do we defend that claim? The asymmetry of the data in the control group speaks
against the assumption of Normality. Note further that the data points are noted as
integer values which speaks for a discrete distribution, instead of a continuous one
like the Normal distribution. Hacking’s other guidelines also fail: If the medical treat-
ment is a novel one, and we choose a parametric model by analogy to an old drug,
we implicitly impose constraints on our interpretation of the observations, instead of
taking an unbiased perspective. Finally, in such a complex process as the effect of
chemical drugs on biological organisms, there is no overarching theory which directly
links chemical properties of the drug to the survival time of the mice. Thus, model
specification is quite difficult and risky. Furthermore, having a specific model of drug
efficacy is arguably less important than knowing that the drug is effective at all and
that we should administer it in future cases. (Especially if not mice, but humans are
assigned medical treatment after a serious surgery.)
The latter goal—predicting future performance—has become especially important
in modern science. Geophysical and meteorological models provide paradigmatic
examples. The availability of loads of data on the actual weather together with our
geophysical theory gives us a sensible idea of the local weather in the next 24 hours.
But it would be presumptuous to capture the essential structure of complex systems,
such as the Earth’s climate, through explicit, parametric models, even if the underlying
physics are roughly understood. First, the scale of the model is simply too large to
warrant that a model parameter can still be meaningfully mapped to a real physical
quantity (such as moist convection or surface pressure at a particular spot). Second,
the number of physical interactions in a system that is as complex as Earth’s climate
are so numerous and messy that
“we know a priori that there is no combination of parametrizations, parameter
values and initial conditions which would accurately mimic all relevant aspects
of the climate system.”8
In light of these limitations of parametric statistical modeling, modern science has to
make recourse to more parsimonious assumptions. In particular, forecasting techniques
8 (Stainforth et al., 2007, p. 2148). Italics in the original. Cf. Sprenger (2009) for a philosophically minded
discussion of statistical inference in the face of model uncertainty.
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that are guided by data (such as mathematical extrapolation techniques) often replace
predictions that have been gained by a top-down approach and stipulating an explicit
model.
Of course, the statistical techniques for detecting model misspecification become
more and more refined. But their power does not keep up with the increasing model
complexity in modern science. Thus, shouldn’t we better seek for alternative inference
techniques? In scientific practice, that conclusion is often drawn and exemplifies a trend
away from explicit models and closed form solutions (cf. Humphreys 2004). This trend
has even reached statistical physics, one of the most theoretical branches of empirical
science. I mentioned the great number of analytic results proven for the Brownian
motion. Still, simulation-based methods such as Monte Carlo methods are nowadays
omnipresent in studying Brownian motion and related stochastic processes (cf. Sharma
and Patankar 2004). While the pioneer work in simulating hydrodynamic processes
goes back to the 1950s (e.g. the Metropolis algorithm), it was the advent of fast and
efficient computing resources that made simulation-based analyses widely available
and practicable. So even branches of physics where parametric modeling achieved
its greatest unifying successes have been infiltrated by numerical, simulation-based
methods.
Moreover, statistics that are particularly easy to analyze in parametric models, such
as the population mean, are notoriously vulnerable to measurement errors, biases and
outliers in the data. On the other hand, more robust statistics of interest as the median
are hard to analyze in a parametric framework. All these concerns show that working
with parametric models does not only have benefits, but also severe drawbacks and
that we need alternative techniques for addressing classical questions of statistical
inference, such as causal inference and estimating standard errors. In the next section,
I illustrate how modeling assumptions can be kept to a bare minimum by means of
computer-intensive resampling methods. There, the actual sample is taken as a non-
parametric model of the population. The bootstrap strategy provides a particularly nice
illustration of the resampling principle and a template for investigating the inferential
virtues of non-parametric models.
3 Resampling methods: a bootstrap case study
One of the most common statistical activities consists in comparing two samples of
different populations with respect to a specific characteristic. This is called the two-
sample problem and it is exemplified in Example 1: we would like to test the hypothesis
that the medical treatment is not effective at all, i.e. that the two samples (the treatment
and the control group) are actually drawn from the same distribution. As argued in the
previous section, we have to test that hypothesis in the face of strong model uncertainty
and little structural understanding.
A parametric statistical approach would assign a specific family of distributions to
the treatment and the control group, for instance a Normal distribution with means
μ1, μ2 and variances σ 21 , σ 22 . Then, we could apply the t-test for testing equality of
the means (of Normally distributed populations) and the F-test for testing equality
of the variances. Since the t- and F-distributions are well studied, such a procedure
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would be easy to handle. But we have already argued that the assumption of Normality
would be highly contentious in the mice example—neither underlying scientific the-
ory nor simplicity nor analogy recommend the choice of a specific model. I show
how bootstrap resampling transforms the sample into a nonparametric model of the
population. Hence, it can be used to make inferences about the underlying population
in the absence of explicit model assumptions, so the modeler ‘pulls herself up by her
own bootstraps’.9
Let (x1, . . . , xm) denote the survival times in the treatment group and let
(y1, . . . , yn) denote the survival times in the control group. Let us pool all those
data into a single sample (x1, . . . , xm, y1, . . . , yn) and let Fˆ denote the empirical
distribution function (EDF) of the pooled sample. The EDF gives equal probability
weight 1/(m + n) to any element of the sample and zero to all other points. Under the
null hypothesis H0 that the treatment has no effect, all the xi and y j are drawn from
the same population. Given H0, the EDF becomes a non-parametric estimate of the
joint distribution of the xi and y j .10,11 Now, the resampling mechanism evaluates the
actual observations under the assumption that H0 is true:12
1. Let b = 1.
2. Draw with replacement m + n ‘bootstrap resamples’ from the distribution Fˆ .
Assign them randomly to an ordered m + n-tuple(xb1 , . . . , xbm, yb1 , . . . , ybn ). (So
an xbi can also be assigned the value of a y j in the original sample, and vice versa.)
3. Calculate the group means x¯b and y¯b for the bootstrap resamples. Then, calculate
the value of the discrepancy-measuring statistic












i=1(xbi − x¯b)2 +
∑n
j=1(ybj − y¯b)2
(n − 1) + (m − 1) . (2)
The denominator in (1) and the complicated expressions in (2) may trouble the
reader, but they have merely technical significance: The distance statistic x¯b − y¯b
is adjusted by dividing it through an estimate of its standard deviation (‘studen-
tization’).
9 In spite of the terminology, there is no analogy to Clark Glymour (1980) theory of “bootstrap confirma-
tion”.
10 The EDF assigns probability zero to all points which are not in the actual sample. Especially in quite
small samples, this assumption is often ruled out by our background knowledge. In such cases, the EDF
can be smoothed using adequate techniques, e.g. kernel-dressing.
11 By estimating the unknown population distribution with the EDF of the sample, the bootstrap generalizes
the principle of maximum likelihood estimation to the nonparametric case. The Glivenko-Cantelli theorem
guarantees that in the limit, the EDF of the sample converges uniformly against the population distribution.
12 Cf. Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
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4. Let b := b + 1 and go back to step 2 until b = B, the number of bootstrap
resamples, is attained.
5. Calculate the fraction of times where the actually observed discrepancy exceeds
the discrepancy in the bootstrap replications:
pobs := 1B #{t (x¯
b, y¯b) ≤ t (x¯, y¯), b ≤ B} (3)
The rationale of bootstrapping is quickly explained. We would like to test (and possi-
bly to reject) the null hypothesis that the medical treatment does not have any effect,
i.e. that treatment and control sample are drawn from the same population. To this end,
we pool both samples into a single sample and draw simulated resamples out of this
pooled sample (step 2). For each of these resamples, we check whether the discrep-
ancy between the two resampled groups exceeds the discrepancy in the original data
(step 3). Under quite mild conditions, the bootstrap is asymptotically consistent (see
Efron 1979; Bickel and Freedman 1981), i.e. for increasing sample size (m, n → ∞)
and an increasing number of resamples (B → ∞), the bootstrapped distribution of the
distance statistic t will mimic the real distribution of t . Thus, we repeat the process a
large number of times in order to get a reasonably high number of resamples (step 4).
At the end, we count the fraction of times where the actual discrepancy between the
group means exceeds the discrepancy in the resamples (step 5). If that happens very
often, it is unlikely to be a result of pure chance, and the result (i.e. a large value of
pobs) will significantly speak against the null hypothesis that the two populations are
equally distributed.13 In the actual example of table 1, we obtain a p-value (or actual
significance level) of pobs = 0.866 for a value of B = 1,000. This is clearly not enough
to reject the hypothesis that the medical treatment is just a placebo since in 13% of all
cases, such a high result would have been obtained by chance.
Note that the consistency results for the bootstrap crucially turn on the assump-
tion that the single data points are independent and identically distributed. Thus, the
bootstrap is not free of modeling assumptions (cf. Rubin 1981). But the assumptions
are of a quite different type—they are qualitative and can be warranted with the help
of a careful experimental setup, controlling that the trials were really screened off
from each other, etc.. Thus, such assumptions are much easier to defend than specific
parametric assumptions, and they replace theory- and parameter-based inference by
design-based inference. In other words, the responsibility for model adequacy lies
with the experimenter’s practical skills rather than with his theoretical understanding.
This allows a more direct approach to testing scientifically relevant claims, without
setting up a refined (and possibly misspecified) parametric model.
Actually, the two-sample problem is characteristic of any situation where two sam-
ples are compared with respect to some characteristic, as the mean, the variance, etc.
For instance, we could ask whether the average height of 10-year-old boys equals the
average height of 10-year-old girls. Or we could ask whether a simulation-based model
13 The use of p-values in testing point null hypotheses has been subject to severe criticism (Berger and
Sellke 1987), but it is not necessary to rehearse the Bayesians vs. frequentists debate since the bootstrap
can be equally applied in a Bayesian framework (Rubin 1981).
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Table 2 Bootstrap estimates of the standard error of the sample median for the treatment group in Table
1, as a function of the number of replications B.
B 50 100 250 500 1,000 ∞
Median 32.21 36.35 34.46 36.72 36.48 37.83
of a physical process is indeed a faithful model of the target process and compare the
two data sets to this end. It is a distinctive feature of the bootstrap that it does not only
apply to the two-sample problem discussed above (equality of two distributions)—it
can be applied to almost all statistical inference problems.
For instance, in the above example, we have tested a causal hypothesis (does the
treatment have effect?), but Demiralp et al. (2008) use the bootstrap as well for assess-
ing the confidence in the result of a search for causal dependencies. Equally, the
bootstrap provides a nice means of quantifying the confidence that we put into a sta-
tistical estimate, as measured by the standard error of an estimate. Analytic formulas
for estimating standard errors are in general only available for specific statistics, such
as the sample mean. In the example of Table 1, we might be more interested in the
median (‘the treatment effect for the average mouse’) than in the mean since outliers
in the data easily bias the sample mean. Thus, we estimate the population medians
for the treatment and the control group by the respective sample medians, leading to
estimates of x˜ = 94 and y˜ = 51. This is apparently a large effect. However, we should
accompany that estimate by an estimation of the standard error in order to quantify
how much of that difference may be due to random sampling. To this end, we draw
bootstrap resamples (xb1 , . . . , xbm) from the treatment group and estimate the standard

















Here, x˜b denotes the median in the b-th bootstrap resample. In other words, we draw a
large number of resamples from the original sample and look to what extent the repli-
cated medians diverge from each other under the assumption of independent sampling.
Then, sˆe is supposed to give a reasonable approximation of the standard error of the
sample median. Note that bootstrap resampling squeezes out all available informa-
tion from the sample (by stipulating the sample as a nonparametric model) whereas
parametric estimation focuses on selected aspects of the data.
In the mice example, we obtain the numbers shown in Table 2. For B ≥ 500, the
asymptotics work fine, and in terms of computation time, the effort for the resampling
analysis is negligible. The observed difference between the sample medians is greater
than the estimated standard error (to be precise, 1.14 estimated standard errors), but
again, a difference of that magnitude may still be due to chance alone.
14 See Chap. 2 in Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
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Again, we see the simplicity and efficiency of the bootstrap at work. And even on a
theoretical level, the bootstrap may fare better than a classical, parametric approach.
Under a large set of conditions, the bootstrap approximation of the standardized sam-
ple mean outperforms an asymptotic analysis based on the central limit theorem.15 So
the bootstrap does not only replace parametric approaches whenever their application
would be problematic or too cumbersome, as in the case of median estimation—it actu-
ally has theoretical virtues on its own. Given all these successes, it is now time that the
philosophy of statistical inference acknowledges those developments and integrates
resampling methods into a unified scheme of data analysis and inductive inference.
4 Summary and discussion
For a long time, parametric modeling has been the unchallenged paradigm for induc-
tive inference in the sciences. As explained in Sect. 1, parametric modeling requires
some theoretical understanding or knowledge about causal mechanism, but it often
yields high explanatory power and mathematical convenience. The coin flip model
and one of its extensions, the random walk, provide a salient example. Hence, a para-
metric framework is also the natural context for debating principal issues in statistical
methodology (cf. Mayo 1996; Royall 1997). However, the increasing complexity of
statistical analysis requires us to focus on nonparametric techniques: The less we
know about a target system, the greater the scale of the model, or the more opaque
the interactions between the modeled quantities, the less can parametric assumptions
be justified and the more likely is our inference to be led astray. Under such circum-
stances, guidelines for correct model specification, such as background theory and
analogical reasoning, cease to apply and the goal of adequate modeling may be hard
or impossible to achieve.
These criticisms, made explicit in Sect. 2, prompted the question of how classical
statistical inquiries may be addressed without contentious modeling assumptions. Sec-
tion 3 drew attention to a particular non-parametric technique: bootstrap resampling.
Due to its parsimonious presuppositions and its versatile applicability, it deserves spe-
cial attention. Bootstrap methods draw simulated resamples from the actual data and
work under much milder conditions, replacing the choice of a particular family of
distributions by the assumption that the observed random variables are independent
and identically distributed. This constraint can be satisfied by means of qualitative
understanding or careful experimentation. In other words, the bootstrap uses the sam-
ple as a model of the population and exemplifies design-based data analysis, instead
of theory- or mechanism-based data analysis that is typical of explicit parametric
modeling. This has general implications for theory testing in science: If a model is
rejected in a parametric hypothesis test, does this negative result transfer from the
statistical model to the scientific thesis which we wanted to test? Actually, scientists
often avoid that conclusion (cf. Keuzenkamp and Magnus 1995). One reason for this
reluctancy is certainly model uncertainty. This worry might, however, be addressed by
15 Cf. Singh (1981).
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resampling techniques which offer a more direct way to address scientifically relevant
questions of inquiry.
To wrap up: Traditional parametric modeling starts with an easily understandable
model, such as the coin flip model. The properties of such a model are studied and we
hope that some of our insights transfer to the target system. This is an indirect top-
down approach—we study a stipulated model before we make inferences about the
real system. Nonparametric models, however, work bottom-up and combine strategies
of direct and indirect inference: On the one hand, the model is directly constructed from
the visible elements of the target population, namely the actual sample. No mediation
via a toy model or an imagined system is required. On the other hand, we can simu-
late further experiments within our sparse data model, and by drawing on the results
of those simulations, we can make reliable scientific inferences. In other words, we
derive our inferences about real-world phenomena from studying simulated resamples
that have been generated by a mathematical model. Thus, resampling inferences are
neither straightforward descriptions nor mere generalizations of observed data—they
combine direct and indirect inference techniques (cf. Weisberg 2007).
To some extent, the dichotomy between design-based, bottom-up resampling meth-
ods and theory-based, top-down parametric methods is blurred in practice. For the
debate about models in science, it seems to be a fruitful project to explore if the two
approaches can complement each other. In particular, I would like to investigate how
the virtues of both approaches—structural understanding in one case; parsimonious,
design-based inference in the other case—can be combined without being exposed to
the drawbacks of either strategy. This is, however, a project for future research.
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